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At the start of December, the U.S. President hosted the leaders of Rwanda and the Democratic Republic of the Congo to sign a peace deal. His pledge was an end to long-standing fighting in the turbulent eastern DRC, describing it as an opportunity for businesses in all three nations to generate significant profit.

Weeks later, however, a completely opposite method for violence emerged. The administration announced that U.S. forces had carried out Christmas Day airstrikes in northwestern Nigeria, hitting sites associated with the Islamic State (IS). On a online platform, the President warned, I had cautioned these Terrorists that if they did not stop the slaughtering of Christians, there would be hell to pay, and tonight, there was.”

A Clear Change of Direction

This contrast exemplifies the central feature of the U.S. engagement with sub-Saharan Africa in this period: a de-emphasis from championing democracy and human rights in favor of a avowed focus on economic deals and stopping hostilities—despite the fact that this squares with the new air campaign in Nigeria remains to be seen.

“We have moved past viewing Africa as a continent in need of handouts, but as a capable commercial partner. ‘Trade, not aid,’ a phrase often repeated for years, is now truly our policy for Africa,” said a high-ranking U.S. diplomat in a visit to Côte d’Ivoire in March.

An administration spokesperson echoed this, saying the President “approaches Africa not as a charity case, but as a powerhouse partner. Under his leadership, American capital, technology, and diplomacy are helping African nations secure peace, build real energy independence, and turn their natural wealth into jobs and opportunity.”

Consequences and Contradictions

This pivot is major, but analysts caution it is early to judge its results. The approach is intertwined with the President’s personal style, which has included conflicts with long-standing U.S. partners and derogatory comments about Africans.

“The guiding idea is, if it’s in the immediate or future interest of the United States, as I see it, then I’m going to do it,” commented a senior fellow for Africa studies at a prominent foreign policy council.

Key decisions have included:

• Dismantlement of the primary U.S. international development agency, USAID. An analysis estimates this could lead to millions of preventable deaths globally by 2030, with a large number in Africa.
• Implementing visa restrictions on citizens from numerous African countries and halting most refugee admissions.
• Implementing a global tariff campaign that has hurt African businesses dependent on U.S. markets, such as textile manufacturers in Lesotho.
• Letting a longstanding U.S.-Africa trade preference act, the African Growth and Opportunity Act (AGOA), to expire without renewal.

Diplomatic Disinterest and Strains

In contrast to his recent predecessors, the President avoided sub-Saharan Africa during his first term. His most infamous engagement with African affairs was dubbing nations on the continent with a crude epithet, which he later admitted using.

“Africa clearly runs dead bottom in his list of priorities, not just for the President, but for the administration in general,” remarked the Africa program director for an international conflict resolution organization. He pointed to the recent U.S. National Security Strategy, which allocated only three paragraphs to Africa in a 29-page document.

A major feud has developed with South Africa, seemingly spurred by claims of persecution against the white minority. This led to a U.S. boycott of the G20 summit in Johannesburg and threats to block South African delegates from the next meeting.

“The narrative of a ‘white genocide’ happening in South Africa fits perfectly now in U.S. political culture and the idea that diversity is not welcome, it’s a threat,” commented a veteran South African journalist based in Washington.

Business-Like Engagement and Targeted Involvement

A similar confrontation appeared with Nigeria in November, when the President threatened to cut aid and send in the military “guns-a-blazing” over the killing of Christians. This ran up against Nigeria’s complex reality as a nation composed between Christians and Muslims and plagued by security crises affecting both groups.

Some Nigerian analysts said that the forceful rhetoric may have spurred the government into increased efforts on security. After the Christmas airstrikes, Nigerian officials said they had authorized the U.S. intervention and might collaborate on further actions.

The President has been open his desire for a Nobel Peace Prize. His administration has brokered in the Congo conflict and sent an envoy to try to forge a peace deal in Sudan’s civil war, as yet without success. While the Congo deal was reportedly broken quickly, it “helps to at least introduce a degree of diplomacy and a channel outside the battlefield,” said one conflict expert.

A Resemblance to Rivals

Experts describe the new U.S. approach as paralleling that of other major powers like Russia and China, who have deepened their involvement in Africa in recent decades based on strategic interests.

“It represents a belated recognition of African agency, and to that extent, it represents, at least at the level of symbols, taking Africa very seriously,” commented one foreign policy analyst.

Realistically, the revised strategy likely means that “a nation that doesn’t have anything to put on the table … is not on his radar.”

“The involvement that we are talking about isn't about spreading the milk of human kindness, as it were, it is about a transactional posture towards Africa,” the journalist concluded.